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In the second half of 2014, some African countries felt the heavy strike of
falling prices of mineral resources on the world market. The international
media raised vocalex positions on the negative impact that China’s slow
down might bring to the African economy. One headline read: “Chinese
investment in Africa has fallen 40 per cent this year – but it’s not all bad
news”.1 More recently, the exasperation intensified to “China’s slowdown
blights African economies”,2 and managed to shadow the China-African
Summit held in December 2015 in Johannesburg. Similarly, on the recent
Africa Mining Indaba, the annual biggest African event for the mining sector,
the renewed concern was stated as “Gloom hangs over African mining as
China growth slows”.3 There is no doubt that China’s presence has had positive
effects on Africa’s growth over the past decade. Nonetheless, only a narrow
perspective would view Africa’s weak performance solely through the Chinese
prism. This article addresses the afore-mentioned concerns regarding the
impacts that China has in Africa. A historical approach is applied to reconstruct
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the economic cooperation since the mid-1990s. This reconstruction emphasizes
the sustaining forces of cooperation. Literally, this article goes beyond the
resource traction sector, to understand the basis of China-African cooperation,
and the position mineral resource has taken in the bilateral cooperation.
With a representative country case study, the current dilemma is shown from
the structure of bilateral cooperation. Suggestions follow on how to address
these challenges.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Africa has been relevant in China’s global strategy beyond the resource
sector. As the resource hunger hypothesis has been the popular
assumption behind the motivation of China’s interest in the African
continent,4 it is not surprising to see this need for resource regarded as
decisive, for positive or negative implications on the African continent.
Consequently, China’s influence has only been watched through the
mining sector.
Three subsequent graphs (Figures 1-3) show that Africa’s economic
partners are diversified, and China is yet to become the most important
player, in terms of African crude oil, or metal as well as non-metal
mineral resources export. For example, in 2009 when Europe and
United States were suffering from a severe financial crisis, these
remained the most important importers of African mineral resource.
2.  CHINA’S INCREASING RESOURCE DEMAND
An examination of the 45 kinds of mineral reserves held by
the top ten countries in the world shows that China is third in the
world rank for a total value of mineral reserves, following US and
4 Such as China accused ofs upporting African dictatorships, hindering economic
development, and exacerbating existing conflicts and human rights abuses in
troubled countries through its business with these countries”, see Peter Brookes
and Ji H. Shin, “China’s Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States,”
Backgrounder, No. 1916, 22 February 2006, p. 11.
36 AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY:  J. OF SUST. DEV. LAW & POLICY VOL. 8: 1: 2017
—Brazil -—France  ——China —-Canada ——US —-EU
Figure 1. Importers of Crude Oil from Africa, 1992-2009
Source: UN Comtrade, 2010.
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Figure 2. Importers of Non-Metal Mineral Resources from Africa, 2000-2010
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Russia.5 The image of “China’s vast territory and abundant resources”
had been so familiar to Chinese nationals before the new century.
Notably, the average per capita of China’s mineral reserves is as low as
58 per cent of that of the world.6 China’s economic transformation
since the 1980s has created a rigid need for mineral resources, as the
term “vast territory and abundant resources” gradually disappeared
from the textbooks by the end of the 20th century. Major minerals like
petroleum, natural gas, copper, iron, coal and bauxite and so on started
being sourced from abroad.7 The increasing trend in resource imports
as at 2014 vis-á-vis 2009 by China can be seen in the following table.
——EU—Germany ——US—France—Japan —Britain—Spain—China—
Belgium—TheNetherlands—Norwegian
Figure 3. Countries Importing Metal Mineral Resource from Africa, 2000-
2009
Sources: UN Comtrade, 2011.
5 China Mining Association (CMA), “The Position of China’s Mineral Resource in
the World” <http://en.chinamining.com.cn/Facts/2006-09-19/1158646844
d1231.html> accessed May 2nd, 2016.
6 Control Engineering and Information Systems: Proceedings of the 2014
International Conference on Control Engineering and Information Systems
(ICCEIS 2014, Yueyang, Hunan, China, 20-22 June 2014). Zhijing Liu.
7 CCTV Documentary: China’s Memorandum, “China’s Vast Territory and Abundant
Resources, Not Any More”, Zhong Guo JiTi Jingji (China’s Collective Economy),
Iss. 10, 2010, pp. 18-19.
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Table 1. World Production of Selected Minerals Resource and China’s
Consumption
Sources: Chinese General Administration of Customs, 2015.
For instance, with oil as an example, using internal reserves, China
became oil sufficient in 1963 and its oil export peaked in 1985.
Observably, a sea change took place very rapidly as reforms such as
openness became the policy drive; the whole economy was transformed
and the industrialization generated heavy demand for oil, so fast so that
since 1993 China has become a net oil importer (Figure 4).
Figure 4. Daily Oil Production and Consumption in China, 1993-20168
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8 EIA, “International Energy Statistics and Short-term Energy Outlook”, May 2015,
refer to <http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH> accessed 2 May
2015.
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At the initial stage, due to limited capacity to import resources
through trade, Chinese companies started to think of foreign
investment. Only in 1987, for the first time, did China Metallurgical
Import and Export Corporate become approved by the State Council
to jointly invest in Australian iron mining with a local partner. Thereafter,
other investment in mining projects gradually followed, including oil
exploitation by Chinese oil companies. These continued in the middle
1990s in several countries, such as Peru, Venezuela, Canada, Thailand,
Sudan, and Kazakhstan.9
In 2001, the Chinese Academy of Sciences published a report
entitled, “Two Resources, Two Markets: A Study on China’s Resources
Safety Guarantee System”, suggesting a go-global strategy to use both
domestic and international resources as well as markets.10 Around
2003, this go-global strategy was formally incorporated into the then
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s comprehensive economic development
strategy. Since then, in order to establish a long-term resource security,
Chinese companies were encouraged to increasingly invest in the mining
sector abroad, from an energy resource to iron ore, copper, tin, zinc,
nickel, and uranium. For the sake of diversifying energy resource,
Chinese companies are also encouraged to incorporate in non-
traditional energy sources like nuclear, solar and other renewable areas
as well as in petroleum. However, as a newcomer, China’s investment
in the extractive resource sector is only growing gradually due to many
practical reasons, and trade in mineral resources for a long time has
been playing, and still plays, a major role in China’s engagement with
the global economy. According to Communiqué on Land and Resources
of China 2014, the total volume of import and export of mineral
resources was US$1.09 trillion in 2014, accounting for 25.3 per cent
of China’s total foreign trade in 2014.11
As supplying sources of most needed minerals has become a very
important agenda, while the security risks in the world are becoming
9 Gu Xueming, “China’s Mineral Resource Strategy in Africa: A Study from
Perspective of Trade and Investment”. A Dissertation Submitted to China
University of Geosciences for Doctoral Degree, 2011, pp. 33-34.
10 Centre for Contemporary China’s Study, “Two Resources, Two Markets: A Study
on China’s Resources Safety Gurantee System. National Land and Resources
Information, ISS. 2, 2001, pp. 28-35.
11 Ministry of Land and Resources, PRC, Communique on Land and Resources of
China 2014 available <http://www.mlr.gov.cn/zwgk/zytz/201504/
P020150422317433127066.pdf> accessed 2 May 2015.
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12 Table made by author according to US Energy Information Administration, China
Report available: <http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH> accessed
30 April 2015 and latest statistics from China Customs <http://
www.customs.gov.cn>
13 The Statistics Portal, “Breakdown of China’s Crude Oil Imports in 2013, By
Source Country” <http://www.statista.com/statistics/221765/chinese-oil-
imports-by-country/> accessed 2 May 2015.
increasingly challenging, the Chinese government has realized the
relevance of diplomatic instruments to enhance its partnership with
more parts of the world to diversify the resource supply. We use the
example of oil to explain this trend.
Table 2. Chinese Oil Imports by Regions with Relative Change (↑ /↓ ), Selected
Years12 (%)
Source: EIA, Energy Information Administration, 2015.
Beginning from 1999, over 40 per cent of Chinese crude oil supply
has come mainly from the Middle East, with the total volume increasing
till 2005. However, the Iraqi war in the previous decade and the Libyan
crisis since 2011 have both greatly influenced Chinese companies’
petroleum trade deals with the Middle East. Accordingly, Africa has
since become a relatively stable oil supplier to the Chinese market
(see Table 3). Thus, oil from a single country like Angola, which replaced
Saudi Arab as the biggest supplier to China, accounted for 14 per cent
of the total importation in 2013.13
 1990 
(%) 
2000 (%) 2004 (%) 2010 (%) 2014 (%) 
Middle 
East  
39.4 53.5 ↑ 45.4 ? 47.1 ↑ 52.2 ↑ 
Africa  0 23 ↑↑ 28.7 ↑ 29.3 ↑ 22.0 ↓ 
Asia-
Pacific  
60.6 15.1 ↓↓ 11.5 ↓ 3.7 ↓ 2.1 ↓ 
Others  0 7.2 ↑ 14.3 ↑ 19.9 ↑ 23.7 ↑ 
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14 Table from China Customs, “Chinese Crude Import by Country” <http://
www.customs.gov.cn> accessed 2 May 2015.
15 Gu Xueming, China’s Mineral Resource Strategy in Africa: A Study from Perspective
of Trade and Investment, p. 35.
Table 3. Chinese Crude Import by Country (thousand b/d)14
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Saudi Arabia 528 727 841 895 1,008, 1,078 1,081 989
Angola 501 598 645 790 625 803 802 806
Russia 291 233 307 306 371 487 490 644
Iraq 28 37 144 225 276 314 472 573
Iran 412 426 464 428 557 440 430 546
Other 1,454 1,556 1,659 2,166 2,228 2,300 2,383 2,534
OPEC 1,817 2,255 2,618 3,029 3,165 3,578 3,617 3,717
non-OPEC 1,398 1,323 1,443 1,750 1,900 1,844 2,041 2,376
Norh America 9 2 9 23 46 36 30 18
South America 206 254 238 393 430 533 534 635
Africa 1,003 1,068 1,224 1,404 1,201 1,284 1,285 1,342
Asia Pacific 119 112 201 179 179 160 132 125
FSU 412 349 432 510 598 704 734 765
Middle East 1,459 1,792 1,955 2,261 2,608 2,700 2,939 3,178
Europe 6 – 3 7 3 5 4 30
Total 3,216 3,578 4,061 4,800 5,085 5,422 5,658 6,092
Source: Chinese General Administration of Customs, 2015.
The criterion to identify the strategic partners for China’s mining
going-global strategy emphasized two sides: one is that those resources
that China is in need of and lack; and the second side is the potential
of the resources in those countries. Neighbouring countries were
selected as the braces, African countries as main objects and Latin
America as considered region.15
3. CHINA’S NEEDS FROM AFRICA:
RESOURCES AND BEYOND
However important, mineral resource stands as only one of China’s
interests among many from Africa. Indeed, according to UN
COMTRADE, natural resources are a major part of the export from
Africa to China – more than half of the total value, 59.6 per cent in
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16 Statistics of China Customs, refer to Liang Ming, “Foreign Trade of Africa”
<http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_58acb4140101itpt.html> accessed 2 May
2015.
17 MOFCOM, “General Survey of China-African Economic Cooperation in 2014”
<http://www.cn156.com/article-43376-1.html> accessed 2 May, 2015.
2013, for example.16 Notably, China’s overseas investments in Africa
exceeded US$107 billion in 2013, and accumulated outbound direct
investment stock reached over US$660 billion. Nonetheless as indicated
in Figure 5, mining extraction is only one focus. The underlying
assumption behind the conventional image of a single-minded hunt
for the resource is the myth of a monolithic China; de facto China’s
interests in Africa have been rather diversified, and the actors that
have enhanced the bilateral cooperation are also very multitudinous.
This explains why, in terms of recipient countries of China’s investment,
mainly there are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Guinea,
Zambia, South Africa, Tanzania, Mozambique, Kenya, Ethiopia, and
Zimbabwe. Notably, Chinese business exists in almost every African
country, including Sao Tome & Principe, Burkina Faso, Swaziland, which
have not established any formal diplomatic relations.
Over the past decade and a half, trade between China and Africa
has increased significantly, hitting a record high of US$200 billion by
the end of 2013, with over five per cent increase in 2014.17 The Chinese
government did give the first incentives for companies that were
engaged in foreign trade, such as tax exemption. As mentioned, even
after many years of operation in Africa, these Chinese companies still
carry their foreign trade corporation identities. Successful going-global
companies, such as Huawei and Zhongxing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE), were able to enjoy rapid absorption into the African
market and from there to the wider world.
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18 The Information Office of the State Council, white paper on “China-Africa
Economic and Trade Cooperation”, 29 August 2013 <http://news.
xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-08/29/c_132673093_4.htm> accessed
2 May, 2015.
19 Liu Haifang, “Chinese Companies in Africa: Status quo and trend”, 50 years’ of
China-African Cooperation (eds. by Liu Hongwu & Yang Jiemian), Yunnan
University Publishing House, 2009.
20 Yoon Park, “Chinese Migration in Africa”, SAIIA Occasional Paper No. 24, January
2009; Liu Haifang, “Mapping the New Migrants between China and Africa”,
chapter in book China’s Internal and International Migrants (eds. by Li Peilin
and Laurence Roulleau-Berger), Rutledge, 2012, pp. 234-244.
Figure 5. Distribution of China’s FDI in Africa, Stock by the End of 201118
Source: The Information Office of the State Council, 2013.
As the Chinese domestic construction market became saturated in
the 1990s, the Chinese contract service companies, together with
trading companies, made up the very first batch of those moving to
Africa. After quickly getting their first barrels of the black gold, these
companies have diversified their business interests by investing in
manufacturing, services, real estate, etc.19 This is why, besides a lot of
small traders, construction companies are the most visible Chinese
business presence on the ground even till today. Small traders and the
Chinese coming with state aid projects from the mainland have made
up the so-called “new overseas Chinese in Africa”, different from the
older Chinese migrants mainly from Taiwan, Hong Kong and other
Southern Asian countries.20 The majority of Chinese companies in Africa
so far are still involved in construction, especially in post-conflict
44 AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY:  J. OF SUST. DEV. LAW & POLICY VOL. 8: 1: 2017
21 Liu Haifang, “Mapping the New Migrants between China and Africa”.
22 Liu Haifang, “Chinese Companies in Africa: Status quo and trend”.
23 CADF Website <http://www.cadfund.com/NewsInfo.aspx?NId=1026>
countries like Angola.21 Angola only heralded its peace in 2002; hence
physical development became a primary goal in its national agenda.
Therefore, as reconstruction commenced on the public and private
infrastructure, this generated huge opportunities as well as attractions
for the migrating Chinese to plunge into the sector.22
Indeed, apart from Africa being a strategic resource supplier and
because of its friendly environment, the continent was specifically
chosen as a pilot field for those Chinese companies going global.
Accordingly, specific policies, as well as incentives, were launched to
help more Chinese companies to come to Africa to initiate their
internationalization project. In 2006, during the China-African Summit
meeting, the incumbent Chinese president, Hu Jintao, facilitated the
Chinese companies’ settlement in Africa by announcing a new policy
instrument, namely China-African Development Fund (CADF).
The CAD Fundhas four main target areas, namely, agriculture and
manufactures that could help African countries become self-sufficient,
infrastructure and basic industries (such as power, energy production,
transportation and urban running water system), mineral resources,
and industrial parks opened by Chinese companies. Up till 2014, CAD
Fund has investedUS$3 billion in over 27 countries, and quite a number
of projects (including some mining projects) have been operating
smoothly. The very successful cement factory and tannery factory in
Ethiopia is an example of these.23
Additional incentives like the six special economic zones (SEZs)
that have been operating in five African countries, involved in various
activities in these economic zones, including mineral processing (instead
of exporting the crude material back to China, for example, the Zambia-
China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone includes copper
processing facilities). Also, a large number of Chinese big and small
companies have been involved in logistics, services, industries,
manufactures, medicals, hotel, trade, and so on. With these incentives
aimed at globalization, more Chinese companies are settling down
within Africa. China Wuyi Corporate Ltd., which came to Kenya in
2002 and has completed several very important infrastructure projects,
such as the famous Thika Highway, unveiled its headquarters in Nairobi
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25 Joshua Eisenman, Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Africa Strategy”, Current History,
May 2006, pp. 219-224.
2. Such as a quite recent academic paper published by Meaza Zerihun Demissie
claimedÿ”As one of the world’s largest consumers, China has turned to SSA for
natural resources, “ and “China’s foreign policy is characterized by
noninterference in internal affairs, which creates a safe haven for politicians to
misuse resource revenues. As long as African governments are corrupt, the
real impact of China’s involvement will not be known.” Refer to Demissie, Meaza
Zerihun, “The Natural Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa: Transparency
and International Initiatives” (2014). Dissertations. Paper 6,University of
Southern Mississippi.
27 On the 6th session of FOCAC, refer to the website of FOCAC <http://
www.focac.org/eng; on the white paper, refer to http://news.xinhuanet.com/
2015-12/05/c_1117363276.htm>
in 2014 to gain the confidence of the host community by showing its
determination to stay in this market.24
The impression that China is coming to Africa as a resource hungry
power has been attributed to the methodological oversimplification of
China’s presence in Africa and the underlying mindset or perception of
China as a monolithic entity with one grand strategy of Africa.25 China’s
expansion in the area of resource need has frequently been reported as
well as its interest in large state-owned national oil companies set up
in Africa. Compared with Africa’s traditional partners whose main
activities are in mining extraction, China’s presence and the associated
impacts in Africa are rather limited. The truth is that China does have
diversified interests in Africa, and the drivers, as well as the actual
actors, also vary because while some come with the active support of
the Chinese government, others come on their own. The exaggerated
narrative on the one-dimensioned resource-driven Chinese agenda in
Africa,26 so far, has overshadowed the multifacetedness of China’s
interest in Africa. Apparently, the agenda is increasingly widening as
well as deepening as the latest session of Forum of China African
Cooperation (FOCAC) held in South Africa and the second White Paper
on China’s African Policy launched in December 2015 shows.27
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28 The Age (Australia), “China’s Slowdown Blights African Economies”.
29 Demissie, Meaza Zerihun, “The Natural Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Transparency and International Initiatives”.
30 Indira Campos and Alex Vines, Angola & China: A Pragmatic Partnership, Working
Paper Presented at a CSIS Conference, “Prospects for Improving U.S.-China-
Africa Cooperation,” 5 December 2007.
31 Horace Campbell & Sreeram Chaulia, “Unequal Equals: Angola &China”, World
Affairs, Spring 2009, vol. 13, No.1, pp. 44-83.
32 Mark T. Jones, “China and Africa – Colonialism Without Responsibility”,7 Mar
2011 <http://www.articlesbase.com/politics-articles/china-and-africa-
colonialism-without-responsibility-4359573.html>
4.  NEW CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION – AWAY
FROM THE NORTH-SOUTH TRADE MODEL
A new round of reflection on China-Africa relations obviously was
stimulated by the hit that Africa has taken from the low price of world
staple commodity market. China was partly blamed for this slump as
its decline in demand affected Africa.28  It seems that China-Africa trade
does not encourage industrialization, and Africa stays indefinitely as
raw materials exporters to China in exchange for manufactured goods,
not so much different from the existing North-South trade model.29
This is a simplified attempt to understand the China-Africa cooperation
based on limited information. Instead of providing a generalized reply
to this type of judgment, the article would like to use a case-country
approach to see what kind of implications China’s cooperation has
brought. Angola, as the biggest trade partner for China from the
continent and even the biggest supplier of oil from the whole world
for a period of time could be one of the best cases reflecting the
characteristic of African external-dependent economy based on primary
commodity, normally explained under resource curse principle.
The relationship between China and Angola has been called a
perfect marriage which has been beneficial to both sides apparently;30
yet this relationship has also been interpreted as the most “unequal
equals”, quoting Nyerere’s famous words to define the asymmetric
bilateral relation between China and Ghana.31 A report published in
2009 reports a departure from other vulnerable African countries under
China’s offensive.32 It shows how Angola has maximized benefits from
cooperation with Asian national oil companies, especially in
comparison with the failed Nigerian government. This collaboration
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33 Alex Vines, Lillian Wong, Markus Weimer and Indira Campos, Thirst for African
oil: Asian national oil companies in Nigeria and Angola. London: Chatham House,
August 2009.
34 Samir Amin, L ‘Eveil du Sud, Paris: Temps des Cerises, 2008, p.148.
35 Horace Campbell and Sreeram Chaulia, “Unequal Equals: Angola and China”.
36 Lucy Corkin, “Uneasy allies: China’s evolving relations with Angola”,  Journal of
Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2, April 2011, pp. 169-180.
37 Paul Jorge (a representative of MPLA), “The Role of Political Parties in Ensuring
Free and Fair Elections in Angola”, speech given in the conference “The
Challenges for Free and Fair Elections in Angola”.
marks a milestone in explicitly representing an Angolan agenda in the
bilateral relationship.33
China-Angola contact dates back to the 1960s when the Angolans
gained their independence from Portugal. China’s anti-imperialist policy
brought its material assistance to all three major movements. In 1975,
facing the tri-liberation movements’ segmentation, the Chinese
government initially proposed a coalition government,34 then had to
sacrifice its consistent standpoint of South-South cooperation for the
greater geo-political need: to counter the hegemony of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which stood by MPLA (Movimento
Popular para a Libertaçao de Angola).35 The impact of this period of
time shadowed the pre-history of China and the MPLA government, an
official tie only established in 1983. Some scholars think this was also
part of the reasons why the Chinese governments have eagerly given
the great number of concessional loans to Angola in its post-conflict
reconstruction as kind of compensation.36
As the war finally approached its end, Angolans determined not to
“grow seeds of failure any more as in 1992.”37 To have an election
based on their own agenda was unanimously agreed among all parties
evolving from liberation movements since the beginning of the 1990s
when Dos Santos-led MPLA government announced the all-around
reconciliation policy and reformed the Soviet-style one-party
government into multi-party election system. To finish the post-conflict
reconstruction, therefore, is the need to urgently re-establish people’s
everyday life as well as continue the process of national reconciliation
without excluding failed parties and the common people as before.
In other words, the reconstruction task facing the MPLA government
physically was to disarm the National Union for the Total Independence
of Angola (UNITA) rebels, remove all the ten million landmines,
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38 This national priority revealed itself through the theme of Angolan Pavilion set
up in 2010 for Shanghai EXPO, “Angola ensures a better life”, indicating post-
conflict reconstruction as immediate and prominent goal. However, the overall
theme of the EXPO was “Better city, better life”, emphasizing challenges brought
by urbanization to the world generally.
39 David Birmingham, “The Role of Political Parties in Ensuring Free and Fair
Elections in Angola”, speech given in the conference “The Challenges for Free
and Fair Elections in Angola”, sponsored by British-Angola Forum, Chatham
House, London, 4-5 July 2005.
40 The European Union Election Observation Mission, Angola: Final Report on
Parliamentary Elections, 5 September 2008 <http://www.eueom-ao.org/en/
PDF/FR_EUEOM_ANGOLA> accessed on 28 March 2011.
repatriate the four million displaced people to their hometowns (most
came to big cities like the capital city, Luanda). All these turned out to
be huge challenges for the capacities of municipal facilities, securities,
and so on. Politically, it was to soften people’s tough hearts cultivated
during the 40 years of war, and reunite all nationals with a clear agenda
towards a better daily life.38
Only six years after the end of the war, after visible changes have
taken place both in the capital city Luanda and Humbo Bie, which
used to be the ruling centres of UNITA, was a new National Election
held in September of 2008.The logistic conditions, as well as basic
infrastructure, were re-constructed largely under the hands of the
Chinese. Given that the Angolan voters had suffered too much from
the war, many of them voted with their stomach,39 which explained
why the apparently well-delivering MPLA won the majority in Humbo,
and only some traditional supporters are still on the side of UNITA.
As other observers favourably commented unanimously, the EU
observer delegation wrote in their report, “Fully reflecting the six years
fruit of reconciliation and peace building, it is the symbol of a united
Angola”.40 If this election is a milestone marking MPLA’s successful
transformation from a revolution movement into a modern political
party with increasing expertise in governance and management, the
six years of hard work of reconstruction had prepared for this
turnaround. This showcases significant Chinese contribution to timely
cooperation with Angola.
Yet, Chinese presence in Angola surely does not only lie in the
construction sector. Independent Chinese traders and entrepreneurs
came to Angola during the violent civil war in the late 1990s, earlier
than both Chinese oil companies and a large number of construction
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41 Interview to Mr. Xu Ning, the Chairperson of China-Angola Business Council,
5March 2009, Luanda, also refer to Liu Haifang, “Chinese Companies in Africa:
Status quo and trend”.
42 Bryan Land, “Getting the most out of extractives in Africa: Dealing With Market
and Governance Failure”, speech made on the international workshop
“Investment and Governance of Africa’s Resources for Economic Diversification
and Development” held by Qatar Foundation, 18-19 December 2014, Doha.
43 Interview at the NEPAD Headquarters, Johannesburg, 16 February, 2011.
44 Tony Hodges, Angola: from Afro-Stalinism to Petro-diamond Capitalism, Oxford:
James Currey, 2001, pp. 102-117.
companies visible since 2002.41 Many of these early comers are well
established financially and integrated within the hosting society of
Angola already.
4.1 African Dynamics in Perspective: The
Ebb and Flow of the Angola Model
Without taking these individual Chinese nationals into consideration,
the essence of the bilateral cooperation at the moment is easily
interpreted just like a relation based on capital in exchange for resources
(oil in particular). China is seen as an unaltered partner given the huge
amount of money flow between the two countries. The tell-all-term
Angola model is fashionable. On the one hand, “the Angola model”, a
terminology created by the World Bank to acknowledge the success of
the resource-for-infrastructure package arrangement between China and
Angola is still often discussed by both policy makers and scholars.42
On the other hand, between the two countries, it is not used any more
even though several new big loans from China have been announced
since the financial crisis. Moreover, this way of cooperation has been
copied many times and has become the most attractive way for other
African countries to harness China’s rapid presence for their own long-
term benefit. Even the New Partnership for Africa’s Development
(NEPAD), the technical vehicle of AU, has also been trying the same
way to start some regional cooperation with China in future.43 The
question is, what is the Angola model, and why this ebb and flow in
Angola?
Having embarked on some reform programmes twice under the
request of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1995 and 2000,
Angola found it desperate to get financial support from the IMF.44 This
poor relationship with IMF and other international donors did not
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45 Indira Campos and Alex Vines, Angola & China: A Pragmatic Partnership.
46 Indira Campos and Alex Vines, Angola & China: A Pragmatic Partnership.
47 “Angolan leader addresses OPEC summit in Saudi Arabia,” Angola Press News
Agency, 19November 2007, quoted from Indira Campos and Alex Vines, Angola
& China: A Pragmatic Partnership.
48  Alex Vines, et al., Thirst for African Oil: Asian National Oil Companies in Nigeria
and Angola, pp. 34-35.
49 This is waiting to be revealed only when more official documents could be
released. Refer to Pan African News Agency, “Dos Santos Returns from China”,
18 October 1998 <http://allafrica.com/stories/199810180025.html>
accessed March 28th, 2011.
change, and the highly expected donors’ conference did not materialize.
When the 41 years of war finally came to an end, the priority was to
kick off its national reconstruction in 2002. Therefore, from Angola’s
perspective, Chinese financing offered better conditions, lower interest
rates, and longer re-payment time than the non-Chinese credit lines
that Angola secured in 2004, and this facility was even more appealing
than commercial loans.45 More significantly, through the 2004 credit
line arrangement, the Chinese provided urgently needed funding for
strategic post-conflict infrastructure projects that Western donors
refused to fund.
 “Integral to this renewed cooperation is China’s need to access
energy resources,”46 President Dos Santos remarked, adding, “China
needs natural resources, and Angola wants development”.47 He said
this on the occasion of the Chinese Premier Wen’s visit to Angola in
June 2006. China started importing oil from Angola since the 1990s,
just like other Asian countries trying to diversify its oil import from the
Middle East; yet unlike its Asian partners’ diversification of its refining
capacity, China’s refinery was constructed according to China’s own
sweet oil products and Angola’s high quality oil fits quite well.48
The initial courtship was mutual, if not to exaggerate a positive
Angolan experience. Among many attempts by other non-Western
countries to seek cooperation since the late 1990s, President Dos
Santos visited China in 1998 seeking for an upscale in the bilateral
relationship between both countries, leading to the ratification of many
pragmatic agreements. His journey in China might also be seen as a
study tour especially in Shenzhen, where he probably saw the fastest
development by then in the world.49 It is hard to measure how much
this important tour contributed to Dos Santos’s vision for Angola’s
future development and how he might have been inspired from what
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he saw in China. The significance, however, could be highlighted, given
the similarities between the two countries, as Dos Santos elaborated
in his letter to Hu Jintao: all the achievements that China has made
have helped Angola and presented it a good model for its own
development.50
Furthermore, evidence of Angola’s dynamism might be seen in the
number of visas the Chinese Embassy issued to Angolans, coupling
with the increasing number of Chinese expatriates in Angola at the
same time (such as in 2008, Angolans got 10,400 visas from China,
and the mainland Chinese, 50,000 Angolan visas). Notably, most
Angolans in China are active public or private business entrepreneurs,
unlike the majority of the Chinese that are migrant construction workers.
Nonetheless,the absolute quantity of Chinese traders and entrepreneurs
in Angola are several thousand already, according to the Chinese
embassy.51
The Chinese loans backed by oil, brought massive changes to
Angola’s appearance, so much so that the terminology Angola model
described the success of this cooperation. Returning to the origin of
the Angola model, there have been various interpretations. World Bank
experts tend to deny its novelty pointing to a long tradition in the
history of extracting sector.52 Brautigam refers to it as a barter-style
trade arrangement, dating back to the period of construction of Tan-
Zam Railway when China exchanged its products with Africa directly.53
Namibian scholar Zongwe, however, focused on its role, as a new
50 “A congratulatory message to Chinese President Hu from Angolan President”,
Boletim Informativo, Edition No. 01, August 2008, p. 2.
51 Refer to “China, Angola Relations Excellent – Ambassador”, Angop, 26 March
2009.
52 Vivien Foster, et al., Building Bridges: China’s Growing Role as Infrastructure
Financier for Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington DC: The World Bank, 2009.
53 Deborah thinks there is a long tradition that China exchanges goods directly
with Africa, and Japan initiated resource-backed loan to India, and then copied
this mode in late 1970s to fund China. Currently, China is copying this
experience in its engagement with Africa, refer to Deborah Brautigam, The
Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa, Oxford University Press, 2009.
Other scholars think it as a “barter trade”, refer to Hannah Edinger and Johanna
Jansson, “China’s Angola Model Comes to the DRC”, China Monitor (S. Afr.),
October 2008, pp. 4-6.
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54 Dunia P. Zongwe, “On the Road to Post Conflict Reconstruction by Contract: The
Angola Model” <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228286407_On_
the_Road_to_Post_Conflict_Reconstruction_by_Contract_The_Angola_Model>
accessed 20 April 2015.
55 Chinese EXIM Bank of course would like to take credit for originality, refer to
the article published by the bank, “’Angola Model’, little plays skillful effects”,
Chinese Foreign Exchange, Iss. 9, 2009, p. 29. During the interview the author
had with the Bank, the analysts expressed no opinion on all the interpretations
above, but emphasized that the Japanese loan arrangement to China in late
1970s was very different from the Angola model.
56 Cao Zhuxun, “Brazil Accepted Oil As Payment to Build Dam for Angola
(translated from American Journal of Engineer News Recorder, 1984, Vol. 213,
No. 23)”, People’s Yangtze River, No. 4, 1985, p. 70.
57 Alex Vines, et al., Thirst for African Oil: Asian National Oil Companies in Nigeria
and Angola, p.46.
58 Liu Haifang, “China’s development cooperation with Africa: Historical and
cultural perspectives.” The Rise of China and India in Africa, eds. by Fantu Cheru
& C. Obi, Zed Book, 2010.
59 Interview to Dr. Zhao, Risk Analyst of China Exim Bank, 17 December 2010,
Beijing.
creation in 21 century, in fostering long-term and sustainable
investment, compared with the one-shot trade arrangement.54
There might not be an end to the debate of origin, especially on
who learnt from whom.55 Indeed, the oil-backed loans for infrastructure
is an approach that Angola has been using since the 1980s. In a piece
of Chinese literature on Angola, records show how Angola had Brazil
to build the Kapanda Dam for it with oil as payment for all that Brazil
spent in 1984.Under the arrangement, the Brazilian national oil
company, Petrobras, was to get 6000 barrels crude oil per day for 12
years.56 At the first glimpse, this should exactly be the prototype of the
2004 agreement between the Chinese MOFCOM and Angolan Ministry
of Finance. However, the former one just targeted one project while
the latter was a package of many projects with the specific decision-
making process and the way the capital operated being greatly different.
At least, this has been taken as an efficient tool for Angolan presidency
to secure spending priorities, bypassing the inefficiencies of the
traditional financial system.57
Since the reform of the mid-1990s, the Chinese government has
encouraged the provision of concessional credit as a major application
of development aid.58 For many specific potential risks, the Chinese
EXIM bank, as the implementer of this policy, was very prudent and
the procedure was very long and slow, particularly in Africa.59 For
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example, an oral agreement of a credit of US$50 million for economic
housing in VIANA II was made between the China and Angola in the
second year after the official bilateral tie was conceived; yet the EXIM
Bank and Angola Bank did not sign the final agreement till 1997.60
Resource-backed loan gives EXIM Bank enough sense of safety, and
comparatively, the scale of loans has multiplied, and the procedures
hastened since the new century. In the entire African continent, the
credit line given to Angola was not the first using this type of
arrangement, some studies show several loans previously given to other
countries besides the small scale facilities (see Table 3).
Table 3. China’s Investment in African Infrastructure61
Host 
country 
Year Value ($) Project Title Resources 
for 
payment 
Congo 2001 280m Congo River Dam Oil 
Zimbabwe 2006   – Construction of coal 
mines & thermal 
power stations 
Chrome 
DRC 2008 9 bn reduced 
into 6 bn 




Ghana 2007 562m Bui Dam Cocoa 
Sudan 2001 128m Construction of power 
plant 
Oil 
Guinea 2006 1bn Souapiti Dam Bauxite 
Nigeria 2005 298 m Construction of 
turbine power plant 
Oil 
Ghana 2010 510m E-governmental 
system & expanding 
water system 
Cocoa 
Gabon 2006 3bn Belinga iron ore 




60 “Angola-China Relations”, Boletim Informativo, Edition No. 01, August 2008,
p. 17.
61 Sources of the table: Martyn Davies, “How China Influences Africa’s
Development”, presentation for OECD Global Development Outlook 2010
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/54/45182621.pdf> accessed 5 April
2011; Ghana Embassy to USA, “Chinese Investors Provide US$ 570m for 3
Projects” <http://www.ghanaembassy.org/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,
detail,0&cntnt 01articleid=342&cn tnt01origid=15&cntnt01returnid=99>
accessed April 6, 2011. “China Gives Ghana over $3bn Loan”, September 20,
2010 <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.
php?ID=190684> accessed 5 April 2011.
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As indicated in the table, some countries had been using the same
resource-backed loan for infrastructural development before 2004, the
year China signed the agreement with Angola. “The Angola model”
might have been the term selected by World Bank because of its
unprecedented scale. Examining the years 2007 and 2008, it is obvious
that those projects under the first US$2 billion Chinese credit line
through which almost all the projects were implemented, whereas the
total sum the World Bank gave to Angola at the same time was just
US$500 million.62
Instead of debating on who first invented the model, the more
meaningful question probably is, under what circumstances would it
operate efficiently, smoothly and be mutually beneficial? It is rational
to assume that the Chinese would have all loans backed by resources
for the sake of security? The second credit line is given with an even
lower rate than the first was a showcase of both confidence and
preference on the Chinese part for this kind of cooperation. Yet for
Angola, it seems the circumstance that is suitable for the Angola model
has completely changed after 2007: the new loans have been signed
without the insurance of oil as payment.
Since 2008 Angola’s oil revenue has been greatly impacted by the
world financial crisis and high-rank politicians, including Dos Santos
himself, who has come back and forth to Beijing to request more financial
support. Currently, several loans have been given through Chinese
Development Bank, ICBC, and Exim Bank as well, and none of these
took the same model.63 In a piece of Wiki leaked news in 2010, the
Angolan President came to China to seek for commercial loan, instead
of one backed by oil, and he expressed to the Chinese Ambassador
that the “Angola model humiliated Angolans” because Angola has
realized that it was neck deep in debt and would try to get itself out of
this debt trap as the deal was collaterization with oil money.64
62 World Bank, “Angola Country Brief” <http://go.worldbank.org/6LIK1A3SS0>
accessed 5 April 2011.
63 Indira Campos and Alex Vines, Angola and China: A Pragmatic Partnership;
Alex Vines, et al., Thirst for African oil: Asian National Oil Companies in Nigeria
and Angola, pp. 53-54.
64 Ghana Webnews, “Foreign Loan-Trap: Ghana Government Is Walking into an
Angolan Syndrome- NPP UK and Ireland Warns”, 11 January 2011 <http://
www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Ghana-government-is-
walking-into-an-Angolan-Syndrome-201027> retrieved on 5 April 2016.
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If this news was solid, the real reason that the Angola model was
not duplicated any more in Angola might be really from Angola’s new
concern after seeing the first round post-conflict reconstruction. People
need more jobs, and the oil revenue is expected to bring in more change
than the reconstruction of infrastructure. This should be seen as a sign
of Africa’s dynamics and the key forces that shape, reshape or even
reverse the direction of the cooperation with China, and how China’s
agenda is perceived.
5.  HARNESSING CHINA’S PRESENCE FOR
LONG-TERM BENEFIT
After the civil war, the booming oil price accelerated Angolan economic
growth, which also lifted the self-confidence of the Angolan government
to persist on its own approach to gradual reform domestically and an
independent foreign policy not dominated by external forces. As early
as 2002, the year the war finally came to an end, many international
aid organizations crowded in to provide humanitarian assistance. This
year saw an official figure as high as US$421 million’s foreign aid to
Angola. Yet, the Angolan government sturdily refused to allow
Genetically Modified Food (GMF) into the country, so that many aid
programmes of these international organizations came to a standstill.65
Likewise, the tough attitude of the Angolan government reveals itself
frequently during its contact with IMF to secure funds for reconstruction,
which eventually gave up halfway and made it turn to China for support.
Probably similar to the experience of President Julius Nyerere, who
ran around the world in vain looking for the money to fund the Tan-
Zam Railway before he finally came to China, hesitating till the last
minute whether or not to speak frankly to the newly established PRC
government that was also not in a prosperous condition. Like the then
Angolan government, Nyerere unexpectedly got the firm promise from
China immediately. Yet this timely help required the Angolan officials
to be quite open about the sum of money involved in their cooperation
with China and also very candid about not wanting to depend on any
single partner.66 As “a masterful negotiator”, the president dared to
65 The Financial Times, “World Desk Reference: Angola” <http://dev.
prenhall.com/divisions/hss/worldreference/AO/aid.html> accessed April 5,
2011.
66 Alex Vines, et al., Thirst for African oil: Asian national oil companies in Nigeria
and Angola, p. 56.
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state, “you are not our only friend” to his Chinese counterpart.67
Practically, after the first national election in which the MPLA
government saw the overwhelming votes as a test of the stability of
the ruling party, the Angola-China relations should have concluded its
journey perfectly in Angola’s agenda of post-war construction. President
Dos Santos made a clear statement at a diplomats working meeting.
According to him, “Globalization naturally makes us see the need to
diversify internationally [and] replace the petrified concept of zones
of influence that used to characterize the world.”68 China had become
just one of the partners in the Angolan array of strategic international
development partners, together with France, Portugal, and Brazil. These
then became the most important four partners’ bilateral affairs jointly
managed by the Reconstruction Office (Gabinete de Reconstrução
Nacional GRN), which used to be in charge of all the cooperation with
China.
If there was no emergency as was the case during the post-conflict
reconstruction, the Angolan government probably would not have used
the Angolan model again to access Chinese capital. In other words, it
would not have used that approach during the financial crisis even
though large-scale infrastructural development was a top priority. In
MPLA’s programme for 2009 to 2012 and the government Vision 2025,
to diversify its economy (especially agriculture) and reduce the heavy
reliance on oil revenues have become the new priorities. This means
that the ability of Chinese investments to adapt to this new agenda is
crucial for its long-term position in the market, and consequently
followed by challenges of financial, managerial as well as technological
capacities and adaptabilities.
Late 2010 saw a final strategic partnership agreement signed during
Vice -President Xi Jinping’s visit to Angola. Notably, the benefits Angola
gained from the bilateral cooperation with China clarified its vision, as
Angola said about their entry Expo in Shanghai, “Our goal is to attend
Expo with dignity and responsible image, and beginning from this point
we want to achieve a position in the world market”.
67 “The Chinese in Africa: Trying to pull together”, Apr 20, 2011 <http://www.
economist.com/node/18586448> accessed April 28, 2011.
68 José Eduardo dos Santos, “Presentation of New Year Greetings by Diplomatic
Corps”, Luanda, 10 January 2008ÿquoted from Alex Vines, et al., Thirst for
African oil: Asian national oil companies in Nigeria and Angola, p. 56.
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6.  CONCLUSION
This article differs from the overemphasized perspective, which has
fuelled the widespread stereotype of China as a hungry dinosaur and
Africa as incompetent and vulnerable. Angola’s story is generally a
gain: with the Angola model used temporarily to harness the presence
of the oil-thirsty monster. The perspective of Angolan government is
that China’s presence presents a completely different opportunity,
probably the most immediate and easy to access that an African country
could have and take advantage of. Eventually, its long-term benefits
can be achieved through bargaining and persisting in its visions, both
domestic and external.
In the view of common Angolans, what could be more convincing
than the rapidly re-habilitated Benguela Railway, which could directly
bring their big or small business from the Atlantic coast to the inner
land of Central Africa and even the Eastern African Arabians?69 Only
through similar cooperation, could sustainable and mutual benefit
result particularly for the resource countries the mining sector might
attract. Observably, this stands for only one of many interests of the
diverse players from China.
There is an internal structural dilemma within the China-Africa
relations, inherent in China’s immediate interests unavoidably
overlapping with those host African countries’. One such interest is
excess labour.70 For instance, in Angola’s case, in the first phase of
contracts of those projects under the umbrella of the first US$2 billion
loan package, the Chinese companies were given all the projects.
However, under the requests of Angola people, in the second phase,
30 per cent was left to Angolan construction firms as local content.
This 70 per cent was still criticized vocally by Angolan economists (let
alone the media, NGOs, etc.), because “the construction sector is one
in which Angolans hope they can find work”.71 The increasing local
69 The recently launched movie shot by BBC Angola entitled “the Chinese Are
Coming”, actually vividly recorded how the village economy is rejuvenated
after the Bengula Railway reopened and the western coast and Eastern coast of
Africa finally reconnected through the landline.
70 The analysis on the in-born structural dilemma of China-African cooperation,
refer to Liu Haifang, “Post-crisis development of Sino-African Cooperation:
practices and perceptions”, China International Strategy Review 2011, World
Affairs publishing house.
71 EIU, Angola Country Report, September 2006, p. 16.
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pressure, it is believed, partly contributed to the end of the Angola
model. Predictably, further cooperation with Chinese firms coming to
Angola will strictly limit the number of Chinese workers. All these
challenge the Chinese firms to upgrade their business and transfer more
technologies to Angolan nationals if they are to stay long in this market.72
It does not necessarily mean that both sides must effortlessly
harmonize their readjustment for cooperation, given the diverging
perceptions of each party. Since 2004, the Chinese workers involved
with Chinese Construction Firms (CCFs) were very visible in Angola
Market, and the prominent presence of the Chinese has been widely
criticized. The Chinese ambassador’s interpretation focused on the poor
input of locals while the Angolan owners of the projects request speed.73
Interestingly, a high-rank Angolan official regarded these jobs as
temporary and not meant for local workers, who deserve permanent
positions after these temporary Chinese migrant workers help to
complete infrastructure and new factories and service sectors are built
up.74 According to the minister, what Angola has benefitted from these
Chinese CCFs, most importantly, is the low-cost techniques. African
construction market may not be able to solve China’s rural and
agricultural issues, but has served as one temporary way to increase
income, sometimes two to threefold of those temporary migrant
workers compared to what they could earn domestically.
The popular discourse has portrayed that the China-driven
commodities super cycle over the past decade or so may have reinforced
the resource dependence of African states.75 Angola’s deal with China
has impacted on its own development, especially by diversifying its
economic sectors as well as its partners in the world. There is notably,
a lot to learn from Angola‘s case to master the most unequal equal
relationship and to gain from the current south-south cooperation with
all emerging powers, especially China.
72 Interview to Golden Nest Group, Luanda, 28 January 2011.
73 Cecile de Comarmond, “China lends Angola $15bn, but few jobs are created”
<http://mg.co.za/article/2011-03-06-china-lends-angola-15bn-but-few-jobs-
are-created>
74 Angolan Finance Minister, “China: A Precious Partner, Though Still Disputing
and Secretive”, a Speech given on the conference “Angola: Present situation
and tomorrow outlook”, 11 April 2008.
75 Martyn Davies, “What China’s Economic Shift Means for Africa” <http://
www.lawyersforafricablog.com/files/2015/03/Screen-Shot-2015-03-31-at-
11.15.57-PM.png>
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As China’s current strategy towards Africa matures, so does Africa’s
strategy towards China. Beijing has never been just an actor in Africa’s
resources sector, and recently it has significantly broadened the scope
of its commercial foray into the continent, indicated in the recent
development of manufacturing strategy launched in May 2015.
